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Abstract
We study an incomplete information, non-cooperative model of the determination
of national emission endowments under a Kyoto type protocol with heterogeneous
nations. The model generates a link between national types and equilibrium na-
tional emission caps. We analyze this link to (a) derive the type-contingent
ordering of emission allocations, (b) study the eﬀects of growth on emission al-
locations, and (c) study the strategies that nations can use to manipulate the
emission allocation process. Synthesizing these results allows us to derive the
implications of national heterogeneity and asymmetry of economic power in the
capping process.
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1.1 Model characteristics
The Kyoto protocol (United Nations 1997) is a response to the apprehension that
carbon accumulation in the atmosphere inﬂicts signiﬁcant global damages. Although this
document is vaguely exhortative on most counts, the following broad steps to restrict
increments in the carbon stock can be discerned: (1) ration each participating nation’s
carbon emissions by specifying national emission caps, and (2) each participating nation
allocates its emission endowment among domestic emitters. A third step being discussed
is whether international trading of emission rights should be permitted after step (2). An
overarching requirement of the protocol is that it comes into force, thereby triggering the
above steps, if and only if a pre-speciﬁed set of nations, i.e., the so-called Annex I nations
(see United Nations 1997), ratify the protocol. In this paper, we analyze a model that
adheres to this general regulatory structure.
One set of studies of the global externality problem caused by carbon accumulation
has modelled the problem as a dynamic game in which nations choose emission ﬂows into
the global carbon stock. This literature addresses questions such as: (a) When does a
non-cooperative equilibrium of the game approximate a cooperative solution? (e.g., Dock-
ner and Long 1993), and (b) What are the eﬀects of ﬁscal incentives on the equilibrium
strategies? (e.g., Patrick et al. 1993). Although ﬁscal incentives are a standard method
of correcting distortions caused by externalities, this approach is incongruous with the
Kyoto protocol. Step (1) of the protocol clearly opts for regulation via quantity rationing
of emission rights rather than via ﬁscal regulation. Unlike emitters within a given na-
tion’s jurisdiction, who can be subjected to ﬁscal incentives by that nation, no comparable
authority exists, nor is one being contemplated, for administering an international ﬁscal
regime on emitters within sovereign nations.
A second set of studies (e.g., Barrett 1994, 1997, Black et al. 1993, Carraro and
Siniscalco 1993) has used the non-cooperative game approach, and a variant of the equi-
librium concept introduced in d’Aspremont et al. (1983), to ask whether nations have
the incentives to participate in an agreement that rations their emissions. This literature
concentrates on questions such as: (a) What structure of incentives will ensure the stabil-
ity of the set of signatories to an agreement?, and (b) What is the size of a stable set of
agreement signatories?
1A third set of studies has analyzed analogous questions in a cooperative game set-
ting with transferable utility (Chander and Tulkens 1992, 1995, 1997, Eyckmans 2001),
using variants of the core (see Osborne and Rubinstein 1994) as the solution concept.
This approach characterizes the ﬁscal incentives required to implement eﬃcient emission
allocations without any coalition wishing to block it.
The above-mentioned literature has not adequately addressed some of the salient
sources of the controversies surrounding the (Kyoto) protocol, such as: (A) the remarkable
heterogeneity of the potential participants in terms of economically relevant characteristics
such as resource endowments, industry structure and technology, (B) the incompleteness
of information regarding these asymmetries, and (C) an incomplete and asymmetric un-
derstanding of the eﬀects of carbon accumulation in the atmosphere.
With respect to (A), this literature has either assumed symmetric nations or formally
allowed for asymmetry without working out the theoretical consequences. With respect to
(B), the literature is couched entirely in terms of complete information games, although
there is no account in the models of how nations verify private information in the absence of
facilitating institutions. While the protocol itself might provide the institutional basis for
information veriﬁcation after ratiﬁcation, the assumption of complete information before
the protocol comes into force seems an implausible description of the informational state of
negotiating nations. With respect to (C), the protocol is implicitly viewed as a complete,
futures and contingent, contract among the signatories. However, merely the recognition
that (a) scientiﬁc knowledge, technology and economies will evolve over time, (b) prediction
of the nature, timing and extent of dissemination of these changes is a precarious exercise,
and (c) many of these changes are endogenously inﬂuenced by the decisions of the various
players, should raise some doubts about an approach assuming completely describable
and contractible states. The uncertainty and learning implied by these observations will
inevitably lead to future renegotiations and reallocation of emission rights. Such concerns
have motivated a literature (e.g., Kolstad 1996, Ulph and Maddison 1997, Ulph and Ulph
1997) on learning in the context of emission choice. Unfortunately, with the exception of
Ulph and Maddison (1997), the chosen setting for this literature is a single-person decision
problem rather than a multi-player game problem.
In this paper:
² We model the heterogeneity of nations and study its consequences under incomplete
information. The objective is to understand the equilibrium relationship between national
characteristics and national emission caps.
2² We show how this relationship can be strategically manipulated by nations with the
wherewithal to do so. These results also formally rationalize some of the political-economic
positions taken by various parties involved in the Kyoto process.
² We view the protocol as an incomplete contract, analogous to a constitution or
a charter, that lays down general principles for determining future emission rights allo-
cations among participants without specifying the future state space and the contingent
allocations.1
Not only does this provide a ﬂexible paradigm for dealing with indescribable future
states of the world, but also provides a framework in which various institutional arrange-
ments and assumptions can be tried and tested. For instance, our general model embodies
two basic principles. First, national sovereignty is inalienable. This view is formalized as
the requirement that allocations for the protocol signatories must be self-enforcing in the
Nash sense. By implicitly ruling out the existence of an international enforcer of coalitional
contracts, this view eliminates the possibility of multiple coalition formation. Secondly,
the decision to participate or refuse is made only at the beginning and is irrevocable. We
elaborate on these issues in Section 2.
The focus of this paper is the nature of the allocation mapping and its possible manip-
ulation, while the existing protocol literature concentrates on the participation problem.
Our general model integrates these two problems and yet allows our questions to be asked
meaningfully and independently of the participation problem. Our special model, which is
embedded in the general model, concerns the problem of allocating emission rights among
the participants in the protocol and the possibility of this process being manipulated.
The general model of Section 2.1 has two stages: the participation game and the allo-
cation game. In the participation game, asymmetrically informed nations choose whether
to sign the protocol or refuse, given their expectations regarding future choices by all the
nations in the allocation game. In the subsequent allocation game, emission caps are al-
located to the nations that sign the protocol in the participation game. We assume that
the assignment of caps among the participants must be self-enforcing, which amounts to
requiring that the caps have to be Nash implementable (see Maskin 1999, Osborne and
1 We have in mind Hobbes’ Leviathan, national constitutions and legal systems, charters for UN
organizations and various regional groupings such as the EU, articles of association for corporations, etc.
For the theoretical issues regarding the modelling of incomplete contracts, see Hart and Moore 1999,
Maskin and Tirole 1999 and Tirole 1999.
3Rubinstein 1994). This general model can be extended in many directions. Our special
model considers one of these extensions.
The special model of Sections 2.2 and 2.3 is a two stage game. The second stage of
this game coincides with the allocation game of the general model, which is now derived
from a natural underlying economic structure. The analysis of this game will yield results
linking the underlying economic structure to the equilibrium emission caps. The ﬁrst stage
of the special model involves choice of national characteristics by one of the participant
nations. Given the structural model underlying the second stage allocation game, the ﬁrst
stage choice will have a natural interpretation as “investment”. The analysis of this choice
will yield our strategic manipulation results.
We end this section with some remarks connecting our model with some of the con-
troversies regarding the Kyoto approach and some of the literature related to it.
(A) The allocation game in our model generates the caps of step (1) of the Kyoto
protocol in isolation from step (2). This is necessary as the protocol views step (2) as a
sovereign choice for each nation, i.e., a nation’s choice of domestic allocation mechanism
and the resulting allocations cannot aﬀect step (1).
(B) Models involving coalitional analysis of international protocols (e.g., Chander and
Tulkens 1992, 1995, 1997, Eyckmans 2001) require the existence of institutions that can
enforce coalitional contracts and any accompanying transfers. We assume that such insti-
tutions do not exist. This view eliminates from consideration various general theoretical
approaches to the modelling of coalition formation (e.g., Bernheim et al. 1987, Hart and
Kurz 1983, Ray and Vohra 1997) as they rely on the possibility of arbitrary coalitions
of players being able to write binding contracts. Our model embodies the view that the
institutions required to enforce such contracts, say the Chander-Tulkens type transfers,
on sovereign nations may not be forthcoming. This pessimism is not unjustiﬁed given the
historical experience of nations being reluctant to cede sovereignty to international organi-
zations. The assumed inability to enforce coalitional contracts also means that the class of
possible coalitions in our model is severely restricted. The only potential coalition is that
of the protocol signatories, with all non-signatories acting as singletons. While this may
be theoretically restrictive, it is consistent with the structure envisaged under the Kyoto
protocol.
(C) Our model is not intended to mime the negotiation process leading to emission
capping. We believe that, whatever be the negotiation process, nations will not accept caps
that violate the incentive constraints postulated in our model. Thus, a mimetic model of
4the negotiations is unlikely to uncover robust principles that cannot be gleaned from our
simple model.2 The only part of this paper that may be interpreted as miming the capping
process is the best reply dynamic process considered in Section 5. As the caps generated by
this process asymptotically converge to the allocations generated by our allocation game,
we view the best reply dynamic not as a descriptive device, but as a computational tool
for deriving equilibrium caps.
(D) Our model does not allow transfers among nations as part of the protocol because
transfers distort the asymmetries that are the focus of this paper.
(E) Our model will also not take into account the possibility of post-capping emissions
rights trading in the determination of the pre-trade caps. There are two reasons for making
this choice. First, emission rights trading amounts to allowing transfers from buyers of such
rights to the sellers, since all that a buyer gets in the bargain are emission rights, which have
a positive shadow value only because the capping regime rations the quantum of such rights.
Therefore, the combination of emission capping and post-capping trade is tantamount to
allowing transfers, which contradicts (D). In any case, such implicit transfers are subject
to the same incentive problems as explicit international transfers and it is unclear why
emission capping should be used as the medium for redistributing resources. Secondly,
the possibility of trading emission rights transforms them into free options with positive
payoﬀs resulting from the positive shadow values of the scarce rights. Consequently, every
nation will demand an unboundedly large allocation of emission rights. This eliminates the
possibility of anchoring emission cap allocations in a systematic framework related to the
distribution of resources and their sensible economic use by sovereign nations. Given the
possibility of trading, the caps have to be allocated using some ad hoc bargaining process,
a rule-of-thumb, or a normative criterion (e.g., per capita equality, fairness, Rawlsian
maximin).
(F) Our position is not that normative criteria, such as the ones listed in (E), are
irrelevant in the capping process. However, we believe that any economically sensible
attempt to address normative concerns has to take into account the constraints imposed
2 A natural game-theoretic mimetic model is a non-cooperative bargaining model. Unfortunately, apart
from some very broad insights available from highly stylized and abstract models, the results from this
theory are very fragile as they vary drastically with the model and bargaining protocol. For example,
there are signiﬁcant conceptual and technical problems in extending two-person bargaining theory to
many-person bargaining theory. As there is no well-deﬁned bargaining protocol for the capping process,
we expect the results from any mimetic bargaining model to be very delicate.
5by positive considerations such as those we model in this paper. More formally, we see
the proper role of normative considerations as that of providing a criterion for choosing
among the equilibria generated by a positive model.
(G) Emissions pose a problem because the historically given carbon stock is large, and
national contributions to the current stock vary substantially. Although one ideally wants
a model that addresses this stock externality problem, we restrict ourselves to the more
modest future ﬂow externality problem by implicitly assuming that the current carbon
stock is accepted as a fait accompli by participating nations or that suitable international
transfers have been made to compensate for past emissions.
(H) Our model decomposes each nation into emitting constituents and non-emitting
constituents with conﬂicting interests. This allows us to model the status quo emission
levels as resulting from the market solution or the business-as-usual solution. Moreover,
the diﬀerence between the national interest and the interest of the national emitter yields
interesting insights about the diﬀerent strategic manipulations each would pursue under a
capping regime.
Given the approach outlined above, we answer questions such as:3
² How are cap allocations related to national characteristics?
² How will autonomous growth of nations aﬀect the distribution of emission caps in
successive rounds of the allocation game? In particular, are emission levels across nations
likely to converge or diverge with economic growth?
² What growth pattern will be favored by green ideologies?
² What strategic manipulations will aﬄuent nations resort to in the allocation game?
² How will a nation’s strategic choices diﬀer from those of the ﬁrms in that nation?
² How might nations or their ﬁrms exploit the possibility of investing abroad?
1.2 Plan of paper
We set up our general model in Section 2.1 and the special model in Sections 2.2
and 2.3. The special model is a two stage game.4 Our maintained hypotheses regarding
3 Some of these issues were considered informally in Shah (2003) in a much more restrictive setting.
4 Needless to say, our use of this device is not novel. However, the economic model underlying the game
speciﬁcation appears to be new and yields novel, natural and interesting insights regarding the possibility
and directions of strategic manipulation of environmental agreements.
6this game are stated in Section 2.5 We study the second stage of the special model in
Section 3. Section 3.1 contains the basic variational formulae ﬂowing from the model and
their implications. These formulae imply results regarding the ordering of national caps in
Section 3.2. In Section 4, we study the ﬁrst stage of the special model. Depending on the
identity and decision variable of the ﬁrst stage decision-maker(s), we have the socialist case
(Section 4.2), the capitalist case (Section 4.3), the mixed case (Section 4.4) and the global
case (Section 4.5). In Section 5, we show that, if the protocol participants use the best reply
dynamic, then the resulting caps process converges to the static equilibrium allocations.
We conclude in Section 6 by summarizing our results, considering some implications and
suggesting extensions.
2. The models
2.1 The general model
Let N be the set of nations. Nation i’s type6 is µi 2 Θ, where Θ is Nation i’s type
space. Let ¹i be the common knowledge distribution of i’s type; ¹i is Nation j’s belief
about Nation i’s type, where j 2 N ¡ fig. Given L ½ N, let ¹L =
Q
j2L ¹j be the joint
distribution of the types of the players in L. Let E be Nation i’s action space. Nation i’s
preference is represented by the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility ui : Θ £ EN ! <.
In Section 2.3, we interpret µi as a pair representing Nation i’s “private capital” and
“social capital”; accordingly, we will set Θ = <2
+. We will interpret ei 2 E as Nation i’s
emission cap if i is a protocol participant. If i is a non-participant, then ei is interpreted
as Nation i’s emission. As our assumptions in Section 2.3 and Proposition 2.3.6 will
ensure that each participant nation’s equilibrium cap is a binding constraint, we will use
“emission” interchangeably with “emission cap”.
The general model consists of the participation game followed by the allocation game.
In the participation game, Nation i chooses a (measurable) strategy Di : Θ ! f0;1g, i.e.,
5 The overly strong and omnibus nature of the hypotheses mean that we make no attempt to provide
the minimal, or the most elegant, set of assumptions for our propositions. The marginal generalizations are
routine. For instance, instead of simply assuming interior solutions as we have done, we could have made
assumptions (e.g., Inada-type conditions) on the primitives of the model that guarantee interior solutions.
6 As is standard in incomplete information games, a player’s “type” or “characteristic” is a compre-
hensive description of that player’s private information, i.e., things known by that player but not common
knowledge among all the players.
7given µi, Nation i non-cooperatively chooses whether to participate in the protocol, denoted
by Di(µi) = 1, or to refuse, denoted by Di(µi) = 0. Consequently, an outcome of the
participation game is d 2 f0;1gN. Given a type proﬁle µ 2 ΘN and an outcome d 2 f0;1gN
of the participation game, the nations play the allocation game. The play of the allocation
game determines the emissions of all the nations by the mapping ´ : ΘN £f0;1gN ! EN.
We construct ´ as follows. Fix µ 2 ΘN and d 2 f0;1gN. Let Λj(¹j;d(j)) be the
posterior belief about µj conditional on the outcome Dj(µj) = d(j). Given L ½ N, let
Λ(L;d) =
Q
j2L Λj(¹j;d(j)) be the posterior joint distribution of the types of the players in
L, conditional on their participation decisions (Dj(µj))j2L = (d(j))j2L. If i 2 d¡1(0), then
Nation i’s emission is given exogenously by the mapping ¯ e : Θ ! E. If the participants,
i.e., the members of d¡1(1), implement the action proﬁle e 2 Ed
¡1(1), then the expected








; if d¡1(0) 6= ;
ui(µi;e); if d¡1(0) = ;
(2:1:1)
The participants jointly determine emissions as follows. An allocation e 2 Ed
¡1(1) is
proposed and each i 2 d¡1(1) non-cooperatively assents or dissents. Proposal e is an
equilibrium proposal if it elicits assent from every i 2 d¡1(1), i.e.,
wi(µi;e;d) ¸ wi(µi;ed
¡1(1)¡fig;b;d)
for every b 2 E and i 2 d¡1(1). This procedure generates an equilibrium mapping e(:;d) :
Θd
¡1(1) ! Ed
¡1(1). Note that e(:;d) is a correlated equilibrium (see Aumann 1974).
Consequently, we deﬁne ´ as follows:
´i(µ;d) =
½
¯ e(µi); if d(i) = 0
ei(µd
¡1(1);d); if d(i) = 1
Before proceeding further, we make some interpretative remarks. Suppose, as we will
in Section 2.3, that








where F represents Nation i’s proﬁt and ∆ represents Nation i’s damage. Given this set-
up, the speciﬁcation of a non-participant Nation i’s emission by ¯ e(µi) can be rationalized as
representing the business-as-usual scenario in which the domestic ﬁrms in Nation i choose
8national emission ei = ¯ e(µi) to maximize proﬁt F(µi;ei), instead of the state which would
wish to maximize welfare ui(µi;e). In eﬀect, we are assuming that a nation’s substantive
choice in the participation game is between (a) maintain the status quo in which the
domestic ﬁrms freely choose the national emission, and (b) allow the state to administer a
national emission cap that is allocated by the protocol.
The above argument relies on the assumption that non-participants choose national
emission ei to maximize F(µi;ei). However, this behavior can be endogenized by supple-
menting our model with a feature of the actual Kyoto protocol. Suppose N = N¤ [ [0;1],
where N¤ is a ﬁnite set of ‘large’ polluting nations7 and [0;1] represents a continuum of
uniformly distributed ‘small’ polluting nations. Then, (2.1.2) is modiﬁed to











Suppose also that the protocol comes into force if and only if every nation in N¤ participates
in the protocol. Given these assumptions, if every nation in N¤ participates in the protocol,
then every non-participant nation will be ‘small’ by deﬁnition. It is clear from (2.1.3) that
every non-participant Nation i 2 [0;1] will choose ei = ¯ e(µi) to maximize proﬁt F(µi;ei) as
we have postulated, because Nation i’s choice has no eﬀect on the total emission. Indeed,
even the ‘small’ nations that choose to participate will behave in the same manner. Given
the supplementary assumptions used in this argument, we interpret our modelling and
analysis of the allocation game in Sections 2.2 and 2.3 as pertaining to an outcome d of the
participation game such that N¤ ½ d¡1(1), i.e., a situation in which the protocol comes
into force because all the ‘large’ nations choose to participate.
Unlike the non-participants, who act atomistically, the participants act as a team
that chooses a joint emission plan e(:;d). As is evident from the construction of e(:;d), we
require that the plan should be Nash implementable, with participating nations, instead
of their domestic ﬁrms, being the relevant decision-makers regarding national emission
caps. The correlation of actions by the plan is represented by the fact that the equilibrium
choices of Nation i 2 d¡1(1) depend on the types of all the participants.
7 These correspond roughly to the Annex I nations in the Kyoto protocol. The congruence between the
two sets is not perfect as two ‘large’ nations, namely China and India, are not Annex I nations. Indeed,
this lacuna is one of the alleged reasons for the US being unwilling to ratify the protocol.
9The assumption of private values is crucial for the postulated correlation of emission
caps. Given the postulated allocation procedure and private values, the incompleteness
of information among the participants is immaterial in the allocation game, although
heterogeneity does aﬀect outcomes. Without private values, the presumed assent of other
players to an equilibrium proposal would allow a player to update his belief about the
payoﬀ-relevant types of the other players. This “learning” may invalidate the equilibrium
status of a proposal. With private values, the types of the other participants are not
payoﬀ-relevant. Therefore, even if a player updates and learns from the presumed assent
of other participants, this updating of beliefs is payoﬀ-irrelevant.
The assumption that emission caps for the participants are recommended publicly is
necessary and suﬃcient for our construction of ´ and the use of correlated equilibrium to
be meaningful. On the contrary, if (a) the recommendations are made privately, (b) the
private recommendations “respect” every nation’s private information, i.e., the mapping
generating each nation’s recommended action is “measurable” with respect to that nation’s
private information, and (c) the mapping generating the recommendations is common
knowledge, then the appropriate solution concept is a Bayesian equilibrium (see Osborne
and Rubinstein 1994). We have opted for the former solution concept to describe the
outcomes of the allocation game as publicly announced proposals seem a more accurate
description of international agreements.
Returning to the formal speciﬁcation of the general model, Nation i’s payoﬀ in the
participation game, anticipating ´ as the generator of actions in the allocation game, and
conditional on µ and d, is ui(µi;´(µ;d)). Given a proﬁle of strategies (Dj)j2N, di 2 f0;1g










The proﬁle of strategies (Dj)j2N is required to be a Bayesian equilibrium, i.e., for every
µ 2 ΘN, i 2 N and di 2 f0;1g, we have Ui(µi;DN¡fig;Di(µi)) ¸ Ui(µi;DN¡fig;di).
Clearly, the above model can be extended in the following directions: (a) allow mul-
tiple rounds of the allocation game, (b) allow types to evolve across rounds, and (c) allow
multiple entry and exit times with respect to the participation decision. Extension (a), in
the absence of (b) and (c), turns the post-participation game into an incomplete informa-
tion repeated game. Given the interpretation of types in Section 2.3, it is more natural
to allow (b) as well, with the transition of types across rounds being, at least in part,
10endogenously determined. If types evolve and are common knowledge in each round of the
allocation game (perhaps because the protocol mandates information sharing), then the
post-participation game becomes a stochastic game. However, if types are not common
knowledge in the various rounds of the allocation game, then the game is further com-
plicated by the phenomenon of learning behavior by the players. Learning behavior by
later entrants into the protocol is also implied by extension (c). In addition, (c) introduces
obvious timing game issues.
The special allocation game of Sections 2.2 and 2.3 models one of the above-mentioned
extensions: given a type proﬁle µ 2 ΘN and an outcome d 2 f0;1gN of the participation
game, some participating nation, say Nation 1, will be allowed to alter its type µ1 to µ0
1
before the allocation game. A number of variants of the special allocation game can be
formulated, depending on who chooses µ0
1. For instance, if Nation 1 chooses µ0










1) is the cost of moving from µ1 to µ0
1. On the other hand, if µ0
1 is chosen to








2.2 The special allocation game
Fix a type proﬁle µ 2 ΘN and an outcome d 2 f0;1gN of the participation game. Let
d¡1(1) = N = f1;2g. Then (2.1.1) implies that wi(µi;a;d) = ui(µi;a) for i 2 f1;2g. The
assumption that all nations participate involves no loss of generality in our analysis as the
behavior of non-participants is exogenously given by the business-as-usual hypothesis and,
by (2.1.1), it can be integrated out using the posterior belief about their types. N = f1;2g
is the minimal setting in which we can ask our questions sensibly and get sharp answers. It
is possible to complicate the model with more players at the cost of having to qualify our
propositions appropriately. Set Λ2(¹2;1) = ¸, E = <+ and µ1 = 0; supp¸ will denote the
support of ¸. ¸ is Nation 1’s posterior belief about Nation 2’s type conditional on Nation
















Given these speciﬁcations, the special allocation game Γ is described as follows.
f0;1;2g is the set of players in Γ. Players 1 and 2 correspond to Nations 1 and 2 re-
spectively. The extensive form of Γ is as follows. First, Nature chooses Player 2’s type
µ2 2 Θ; ¸ is the common belief of Players’ 0 and 1 about µ2. In Stage 1 of Γ, given ¸,
Player 0 chooses Player 1’s type µ1 2 Θ. In Stage 2 of Γ, Players’ 1 and 2 jointly choose
the action proﬁle e = (e1;e2) 2 <2
+. Given (µ1;µ2) and e, Player 0’s payoﬀ is u0(µ1;e),
Player 1’s payoﬀ is u1(µ1;e) and Player 2’s payoﬀ is u2(µ2;e).
The choice of actions in Stage 2 is described by a team plan e(:;d) : Θ2 ! <2
+, i.e.,
ui(µi;e(µ;d)) ¸ ui(µi;e0
i;eN¡fig(µ;d)) for every µ 2 Θ2, every i 2 f1;2g and every e0
i 2 <+.
Thus, ´(:;d) = e(:;d). In Stage 1 of Γ, Player 0 anticipates that the Stage 2 actions will




Given ´(:;d) = e(:;d), (2.2.3) coincides with (2.2.1) if we set
u0(µ1;e(µ1;µ2;d)) = u1(µ1;e(µ1;µ2;d)) ¡ C(0;µ1) (2:2:4)
i.e., µ1 is chosen to maximize Nation 1’s welfare, and (2.2.3) coincides with (2.2.2) if
u0(µ1;e(µ1;µ2;d)) = F1(µ1;e1(µ1;µ2;d)) ¡ C(0;µ1) (2:2:5)
i.e., µ1 is chosen to maximize Nation 1’s proﬁt.
Deﬁnition 2.2.6. hµ1;ei is an equilibrium of Γ if e : Θ2 ! <2
+ is a team plan for Γ and
µ1 maximizes (2.2.3).







Clearly, Player 0 prefers µ0
1 to µ1 ex post. It also represents ex ante strategic manipulation
by Player 0 because it reﬂects Player 0’s ability to choose the Stage 2 subgame via his
Stage 1 choice.
122.3 Interpretation of special allocation game
In this section, we present a structural model that rationalizes the abstract special
allocation model of Section 2.2. Given observation (A) of Section 1.1, it is sensible, for
the purpose of modelling step (1) of the protocol, to aggregate Nation i’s emitters into
a national Firm i. Similarly, all non-emitting entities in Nation i are aggregated into a
national Consumer i. We assume that Firm i does not suﬀer any production externality
from global emissions but Consumer i suﬀers a global consumption externality. Thus,
within Nation i, there is conﬂict between Firm i and Consumer i. This conﬂict may also
be interpreted as the divergence between the interests of owners of polluting ﬁrms and the
rest of society.
If Firm i, with private capital ti, employs variable input vi, then its proﬁt is g(ti;vi)
and its emission is h(ti;vi); since Firm i is the only emitter in Nation i, g(ti;vi) and
h(ti;vi) are also Nation i’s proﬁt and emission respectively. The resulting total world
emission h(t1;v1) + h(t2;v2) is consumed by Consumers 1 and 2, thereby causing damage
±(ki;h(t1;v1) + h(t2;v2)) to Consumer (and Nation) i who has social capital ki.
Θ = <2
+ is Nation i’s type space. Nation i’s type is given by the pair µi = (ti;ki).
Given our interpretation of types, international diﬀerences in private and social capital are
the only sources of international heterogeneity. Private capital ti consists of all ﬁxed inputs
that embody the technology available to Firm i. Social capital ki consists of all assets that
are used to mitigate the damage caused by emissions; ki embodies the technology available
to Consumer i. Social capital includes water management systems, meteorological facilities,
knowledge of the ways to cope with the eﬀects of global warming (e.g., how farming needs
to adapt to environmental changes), research facilities that generate such technologies, etc.
Prior to signing the protocol, Firm i maximizes proﬁt g(ti;vi) by choosing variable
input v(ti). The resulting proﬁt and emission for Nation i are g(ti;v(ti)) and h(ti;v(ti))
respectively, and Nation i’s damage is ±(ki;h(t1;v(t1)) + h(t2;v(t2))). We refer to this
situation as business-as-usual or the status quo.
If Nation i’s emission is capped at ei, then domestic regulation imposes the constraint
h(ti;vi) · ei on Firm i. Suppose Firm i chooses variable input vi = vc(ti;ei) to maximize
g(ti;vi) under this constraint. The resulting proﬁt for Firm i and Nation i is g(ti;vc(ti;ei)),
Nation i’s emission is
h(ti;vc(ti;ei)) · ei (2:3:1)
13and its damage is
±(ki;h(t1;vc(t1;e1)) + h(t2;vc(t2;e2))) (2:3:2)
Consequently, Nation i’s payoﬀ (or welfare) is
g(ti;vc(ti;ei)) ¡ ±(ki;h(t1;vc(t1;e1)) + h(t2;vc(t2;e2))) (2:3:3)
If it is publicly recommended to (or agreed by) Nations 1 and 2 that they impose the
emission caps e1 and e2 on Firms 1 and 2 respectively, then Nation 1 will implement the




Λ(¹2;1)(dx)±(k1;h(t1;vc(t1;e1)) + h(t2(x);vc(t2(x);e2))) (2:3:4a)
given e2 as Nation 2’s emission cap. Analogously, Nation 2 will implement cap e2 only if




Λ(¹1;1)(dx)±(k2;h(t2;vc(t2;e2)) + h(t1(x);vc(t1(x);e1))) (2:3:4b)
given e1 as Nation 1’s cap. While Nation i chooses the emission cap to maximize expected
national welfare, Firm i chooses the actual emission level to maximize its proﬁt subject
to the cap chosen by Nation i. In principle, constraint (2.3.1) may be non-binding, and
consequently, the international emission proﬁle can diﬀer from the proﬁle of caps. This
divergence can complicate the modelling of emission capping as the costs and beneﬁts
of capping are generated by the actual emissions that result from capping, rather than
the caps per se. Proposition 2.3.6 will eliminate this problem. We assume the following
throughout the rest of this paper.
Assumption 2.3.5. g : <2
+ ! <+ and h : <2
+ ! <+ are such that, for every t 2 <+,
(a) g(t;:) is strictly increasing upto a unique maximum at v(t), and
(b) h(t;:) is continuous and strictly increasing.
Moreover, ± : <2
+ ! <+ is
(c) continuous, and twice continuously diﬀerentiable on <2
++ with Dke+± < 0.8
8 Throughout the rest of this paper, D is the diﬀerential operator; with appropriate subscripts, it
indicates partial derivatives.
14(d) For every k > 0, ±(k;:) is strictly increasing and strictly convex.
(e) For every e+ > 0, ±(:;e+) is strictly decreasing and strictly convex.
Assumption (a) means that proﬁt increases with variable input until the maximum
is attained. Assumption (b) implies that emission increases with the variable input. As-
sumption (c) implies that greater social capital reduces a nation’s vulnerability to damage.
Assumption (d) means that a nation’s damage increases at an increasing rate with global
emission. Assumption (e) means that a nation’s damage decreases with social capital but
this beneﬁcial eﬀect is subject to diminishing returns.
Assumptions (a) and (b) imply that (2.3.1) is binding if and only if ei · h(ti;v(ti)).
Therefore, ei · h(ti;v(ti)) implies the identity h(ti;vc(ti;ei)) = ei. If ei ¸ h(ti;v(ti)),
then vc(ti;ei) = v(ti), i.e., the status quo prevails in Nation i.
Proposition 2.3.6. If µi = (ti;ki) 2 Θ is the type of Nation i 2 f1;2g and (e¤
1;e¤
2) is a
pair of emission caps such that e1 = e¤
1 (resp. e2 = e¤
2) maximizes (2.3.4a) (resp. (2.3.4b))
given e2 = e¤
2 (resp. e1 = e¤
1), then e¤
i < h(ti;v(ti)) for i 2 f1;2g.
Proof. We show that e¤
1 < h(t1;v(t1)); e¤
2 < h(t2;v(t2)) can be shown analogously. If






which is invariant with respect to e1. If e1 · h(t1;v(t1)), then h(t1;vc(t1;e1)) = e1 and






Diﬀerentiating the ﬁrst term of (2.3.7) with respect to e1 and evaluating the derivative at
e1 = h(t1;v(t1)), we have
Dv1g(t1;vc(t1;h(t1;v(t1))))De1vc(t1;h(t1;v(t1))) = Dv1g(t1;v(t1))De1vc(t1;h(t1;v(t1)))
= 0
as v1 = v(t1) maximizes g(t1;v1). Diﬀerentiating the second term of (2.3.7) with respect






15Therefore, e1 = h(t1;v(t1)) cannot maximize (2.3.7). Since Nation 1’s expected payoﬀ is
invariant with respect to e1 for e1 ¸ h(t1;v(t1)), we have e¤
1 < h(t1;v(t1)).
This means a team plan ensures that the protocol participants (speciﬁcally, the ‘large’
nations in N¤) always choose lower emission caps than their status quo emission levels.
Consequently, without loss of generality, we restrict attention to caps ei · h(ti;v(ti)) for
i 2 f1;2g. The resulting identiﬁcation of caps with chosen emission levels, represented by
the identity ei = h(ti;vc(ti;ei)) for ei · h(ti;v(ti)), has a number of useful consequences.
First, it reduces the number of variables by identifying caps with emissions. Secondly,
(2.3.2) is simpliﬁed to ±(ki;e1 +e2) and Nation i’s payoﬀ in Stage 2 of Γ is simpliﬁed from
(2.3.3) to
ui(ti;ki;e1;e2) = f(ti;ei) ¡ ±(ki;e1 + e2) (2:3:8)
where
f(ti;ei) = g(ti;vc(ti;ei)) (2:3:9)
for i 2 f1;2g. This is a vital simpliﬁcation as it ensures that the private values assumption
is satisﬁed when caps are allocated. Thirdly, a nation’s preference, given by (2.3.8), is
not monotonically increasing with respect to the national cap, for a larger (binding) cap
induces greater emission by the national ﬁrm, thereby increasing the ﬁrm’s proﬁt, but
it also increases the damage suﬀered by the national consumer. Thus, by attaching an
endogenously generated shadow value to emission rights, our model prevents nations from
pursuing arbitrarily large caps. Consequently, results in Section 4 asserting that a nation
manipulates characteristics to increase its emission cap do not reﬂect a trivial desire to
have an arbitrarily large amount of a free positive valued option, but a desire to have a
speciﬁc larger cap for strategic reasons.
In Stage 1 of Γ, Player 0 chooses µ1 = (t1;k1). We interpret Player 0 as either Nation
1 or Firm 1. We specialize (2.2.4) and (2.2.5) by setting C(0;µ1) = C(0;(t1;k1)) = t1+k1,
and use (2.3.8) to specify Player 0’s payoﬀ as
u0(t1;k1;e1;e2) = f(t1;e1) ¡ ±(k1;e1 + e2) ¡ t1 ¡ k1 (2:3:10)
if Player 0 is Nation 1, and as
u0(t1;k1;e1;e2) = f(t1;e1) ¡ t1 ¡ k1 (2:3:11)
if Player 0 is Firm 1. We end this section with some assumptions that have technical and
interpretational signiﬁcance. We assume the following throughout the rest of this paper.
16Assumption 2.3.12. f, deﬁned by (2.3.9), satisﬁes the following properties.
(a) f is strictly increasing and strictly concave.
(b) f is continuous, and twice continuously diﬀerentiable on <2
++.
If a ﬁrm has private capital t0 and faces an emission cap e0, then Def(t0;e0) is the
ﬁrm’s shadow value of emission rights. The following deﬁnition classiﬁes technology as
locally clean (resp. dirty) if the shadow value of emission rights decreases (resp. increases)
with increases in private capital.
Deﬁnition 2.3.13. Technology f is dirty (resp. clean) at (t0;e0) if Dtef(t0;e0) > 0 (resp.
Dtef(t0;e0) < 0).
We assume the following throughout the rest of this paper.
Assumption 2.3.14. (µ1;e) is an equilibrium of Γ such that
(a) µ1 = (t1;k1) À 0 and e(µ) À 0 for every µ 2 Θ2, and
(b) Player 0 can be either Nation 1 or Firm 1.
3. Stage 2 of special model
3.1 Comparative statics
In this section we analyze the properties of the team plan e : Θ2 ! <2
+ for Stage 2 of
Γ. As e is a team plan, we have
Deiui(µi;e(µ)) = 0 (3:1:1)
for i 2 f1;2g. By Assumptions 2.3.5 and 2.3.12, and (2.3.8), we have
Deieiui(µi;e) < 0 and detA(µ;e) > 0 (3:1:2)


















Given e(µ) = (e1(µ);e2(µ)), let e¡(µ) = e1(µ)¡e2(µ). Specializing (3.1.3) yields the eﬀects
of variations in private and social capital.
17Proposition 3.1.4. Let µ = ((t1;k1);(t2;k2)).
(A) If Dtef(t1;e1(µ)) < 0, then Dt1e1(µ) < 0, Dt1e2(µ) > 0, Dt1e+(µ) < 0 and
Dt1e¡(µ) < 0.
(B) If Dtef(t1;e1(µ)) > 0, then Dt1e1(µ) > 0, Dt1e2(µ) < 0, Dt1e+(µ) > 0 and
Dt1e¡(µ) > 0.
(C) Dk1e1(µ) > 0, Dk1e2(µ) < 0 and Dk1e+(µ) > 0.
(A) (resp. (B)) means that the growth of private capital in a clean (resp. dirty) nation
implies lower (resp. higher) domestic emission, higher (resp. lower) foreign emission, lower
(resp. higher) global emission, and assuming e¡(µ) > 0, convergence (resp. divergence) of
national emissions. (C) means that the growth of social capital implies higher domestic
emission, lower foreign emission and higher global emission.
3.2 Emission cap ordering
We ﬁrst consider the ordering of emission caps implied by the ordering of social capital.
Proposition 3.2.1. If µ = ((t;k1);(t;k2)) and k1 > k2, then e1(µ) > e2(µ).
Proof. As k1 > k2, Assumption 2.3.5(c) implies 0 < De+±(k1;e+(µ)) < De+±(k2;e+(µ)).
This, together with (3.1.1), implies
R e1(µ)
e2(µ) dxDeef(t;x) = Def(t;e1(µ))¡Def(t;e2(µ)) < 0.
Assumption 2.3.12(a) implies e1(µ) > e2(µ).
Ceteris paribus, nations with larger social capital have larger emissions. The ordering
of emissions in terms of private capital is more complicated as Proposition 3.1.4 shows that
the nature of technology aﬀects the directions in which the emissions change as private
capital varies.
Proposition 3.2.2. If
(a) µ = ((t1;k);(t2;k)) and t1 > t2,
(b) Dtef(t1;e1(µ)) > 0 and Dtef(t2;e2(µ)) > 0 (resp. Dtef(t1;e1(µ)) < 0 and
Dtef(t2;e2(µ)) < 0), and
(c) for every e0, Dtef(:;e0) is decreasing,
then e1(µ) > e2(µ) (resp. e1(µ) < e2(µ)).
Proof. Suppose Dtef(t1;e1(µ)) > 0 and Dtef(t2;e2(µ)) > 0. (c) implies Dtef(x;e1(µ)) >




dy Deef(t2;y) = Def(t2;e2(µ)) ¡ Def(t2;e1(µ))






Assumption 2.3.12(a) implies e1(µ) > e2(µ). The other case follows analogously.
If (a) both nations have the same social capital stock, (b) both nations have clean
(resp. dirty) technology, and (c) technology becomes cleaner as private capital grows, then
the nation with the greater private capital stock has lower (resp. higher) emission.
4. Stage 1 of special model
4.1 Set-up
In this section we consider Player 0’s choices in Stage 1 of Γ. In Section 4.2 (resp.
4.3), we consider the socialist (resp. capitalist) case, in which Player 0 is interpreted as
Nation 1 (resp. Firm 1) choosing domestic private and domestic social capital. In Section
4.4 we consider the mixed case when Nation 1 chooses domestic social capital while Firm
1 chooses domestic private capital. In Section 4.5 we consider the global case when Nation
1 or Firm 1 can choose foreign social and private capital.
We shall interpret the choices of capital stock as investment by normalizing the his-
torically given stock to zero. Moreover, our piecemeal analysis of investment decisions is
without loss of generality because the cost of investment is linear additive, as in (2.3.10)
and (2.3.11).
4.2 The socialist case
Combining (2.2.3) and the interpretation of u0 given by (2.3.10), Nation 1’s problem
is to choose (t1;k1) to maximize
Z
Θ
¸(dµ2)u1(t1;k1;e(t1;k1;µ2)) ¡ t1 ¡ k1
Let (t¤;k¤) solve this problem. Given this solution, denote e(t¤;k¤;µ2), e1(t¤;k¤;µ2),

























First consider the choice of social capital. Using Assumption 2.3.5(c) and Proposition
3.1.4(C), the beneﬁts of investment in social capital are: (a) an increase in domestic proﬁt
caused by higher domestic emission, (b) lower domestic vulnerability to damage, and (c)
a decrease in domestic damage on account of lower foreign emission. The costs are: (d) an
increase in domestic damage caused by higher domestic emission, and (e) the opportunity
cost of investment. The fact that emissions are always chosen by the team plan means
that beneﬁt (a) and cost (d) are always balanced at the margin. Thus, (4.2.2) ensures
that marginal beneﬁts (b) and (c) are balanced by the marginal cost (e). (b) is the direct
beneﬁt of investment in social capital, while (c) is the indirect or strategic beneﬁt.
Let (t0;k0) be Nation 1’s choice of private and social capital given the type contingent
emissions µ2 7! e¤(µ2), i.e., (t1;k1) = (t0;k0) maximizes
Z
Θ
¸(dµ2)u1(t1;k1;e¤(µ2)) ¡ t1 ¡ k1








+(µ2)) = ¡1 (4:2:4)
k¤ > k0 (resp. k¤ < k0) is interpreted as strategic overinvestment (resp. underinvestment)


























which implies k0 < k¤ as Dkk± > 0.
20Proposition 4.2.5. Nation 1 overinvests in domestic social capital, thereby strategically
raising e1, lowering e2 and raising e+.
Now consider the choice of private capital. t¤ > t0 (resp. t¤ < t0) is interpreted as
strategic overinvestment (resp. underinvestment) by Nation 1 in domestic private capital.
Proposition 4.2.6. If Dtef(t¤;e¤
1(µ2)) < 0 (resp. Dtef(t¤;e¤
1(µ2)) > 0) for every µ2 2
supp¸, then Nation 1 underinvests (resp. overinvests) in domestic private capital, thereby
strategically raising e1, lowering e2 and raising e+.
Proof. Suppose Dtef(t¤;e¤














Consider µ2 2 supp¸. As Dtef(t¤;e¤
1(µ2)) < 0, Proposition 3.1.4(A) implies Dte¤
2(µ2) > 0.







Assumption 2.3.12(a) implies t0 > t¤. The other case is analogous.
Since a team plan always chooses e1 to be a best reply to e2 in terms of Nation 1’s
preference, we have the following observation.
Remark 4.2.7. Nation 1’s strategic manipulations (see (4.2.1) and (4.2.2)) in Proposi-
tions 4.2.5 and 4.2.6 work by manipulating downwards Nation 2’s emission.
4.3 The capitalist case
Combining (2.2.3) and the interpretation of u0 given by (2.3.11), Firm 1’s problem is
to choose (t1;k1) to maximize
Z
Θ
¸(dµ2)f(t1;e1(t1;k1;µ2)) ¡ t1 ¡ k1
Let (t¤¤;k¤¤) solve this problem. Denote e(t¤¤;k¤¤;µ2), e1(t¤¤;k¤¤;µ2), e2(t¤¤;k¤¤;µ2) and
e+(t¤¤;k¤¤;µ2) by e¤¤(µ2), e¤¤
1 (µ2), e¤¤
2 (µ2) and e¤¤





1 (µ2)) + Def(t¤¤;e¤¤
1 (µ2))Dte¤¤





1 (µ2) = 1 (4:3:2)
21Let (t00;k00) be Firm 1’s choice of private and social capital given the type contingent
emissions µ2 7! e¤¤(µ2). k¤¤ > k00 (resp. k¤¤ < k00) indicates overinvestment (resp.
underinvestment) in social capital. Similarly, t¤¤ > t00 (resp. t¤¤ < t00) indicates overin-
vestment (resp. underinvestment) in private capital. Clearly, k00 = 0. Therefore, k¤¤ > 0
represents overinvestment by Firm 1 in social capital. Copying the proofs of Propositions
4.2.5 and 4.2.6, we have
Proposition 4.3.3. Propositions 4.2.5 and 4.2.6 hold with “Firm 1” replacing “Nation
1”.
A team plan chooses Nation 1’s emission as a best reply to foreign emission in terms
of Nation 1’s preference, i.e., by balancing domestic proﬁt considerations against domestic
damage considerations. As Firm 1 does not take domestic damage into account, Nation
1’s emission chosen by a team plan is sub-optimal from Firm 1’s perspective. Moreover,
unlike Nation 1, Firm 1 is indiﬀerent to foreign emission. This immediately leads to the
following observation.
Remark 4.3.4. Firm 1’s strategic manipulations (see (4.3.1) and (4.3.2)) in Proposition
4.3.3 work by manipulating upwards Nation 1’s emission.





¸(dµ2)u1(t;k;e(t;k;µ2)) ¡ t ¡ k







Therefore, Proposition 3.1.4 implies
Proposition 4.3.5. If Dtef(t¤¤;e¤¤
1 (µ2)) < 0 (resp. Dtef(t¤¤;e¤¤
1 (µ2)) > 0) for every
µ2 2 supp¸, then Nation 1 prefers a higher (resp. lower) level of private capital than Firm
1.
We use (4.3.2), Proposition 3.1.4 and Assumption 2.3.5, to evaluate Nation 1’s incen-





+ (µ2)) + De+±(k¤¤;e¤¤
+ (µ2))Dke¤¤
+ (µ2)]
22which cannot be signed unambiguously as an increase in Nation 1’s social capital has two
opposing eﬀects on Nation 1’s damage. On the one hand, it decreases domestic damage
by reducing Nation 1’s vulnerability to damage (the direct eﬀect), but on the other hand,
it increases domestic damage by inducing higher total emission (the indirect eﬀect).
Remark 4.3.6. If the direct eﬀect is larger (resp. smaller) than the indirect eﬀect, then
Nation 1 prefers a higher (resp. lower) level of social capital than Firm 1.
4.4 The mixed case
In this section, we consider a departure from Γ by interpreting Player 0 in a somewhat
more complicated way. Instead of allowing just one actor, either Nation 1 or Firm 1, to
play the role of Player 0, we now allow them to play this role jointly: Nation 1 chooses k1
and Firm 1 chooses t1.
Since Nation 1 and Firm 1 have divergent interests, we model the choices (t0;k0) À 0

























Let k00, characterized by
R
Θ ¸(dµ2)Dk±(k00;e0
+(µ2)) = ¡1, be Nation 1’s choice of social




1(µ2)) = 1, be Firm 1’s choice of private capital
given e0(µ2). Copying the analogous argument of Section 4.3, we have the following result.
Proposition 4.4.2. In the mixed case, Proposition 4.2.5 holds, and Proposition 4.2.6
holds with “Nation 1” replaced by “Firm 1”.
As in Section 4.3, we now ask: in what direction would Nation 1 like to perturb Firm
1’s choice t0?
23Proposition 4.4.3. Proposition 4.3.5 holds in the mixed case.
4.5 The global case
We now stretch the formalism Γ in another direction. In Γ, Player 0 chooses domestic
private and social capital. Now suppose Player 0 can choose foreign private and social
capital. This possibility can be easily integrated into Γ. Clearly, in the absence of a
strategic eﬀect, neither Nation 1, nor Firm 1, will invest in Nation 2.
By Proposition 3.1.4, an increase in Nation 2’s social capital hurts Firm 1 by reducing
its emission and hurts Consumer 1 by increasing the total emission. Thus, even with a
potential strategic eﬀect, Nation 1 will not invest in Nation 2’s social capital.
Proposition 4.5.1. Neither Nation 1, nor Firm 1, will invest in Nation 2’s social capital.




¸(dx)[f(t1;e1(µ1;t2(x) + ®;k2(x))) ¡ ±(k1;e+(µ1;t2(x) + ®;k2(x)))] ¡ ®







+(x)] = 1 (4:5:2)
where e¤
1(x) = e1(µ1;t2(x) + ®¤;k2(x)), e¤
2(x) = e2(µ1;t2(x) + ®¤;k2(x)) and e¤
+(x) =
e+(µ1;t2(x) + ®¤;k2(x)) for x 2 Θ.
If Dtef(t2(x) + ®¤;e¤
2(x)) > 0 for every x 2 supp¸, then Proposition 3.1.4 implies
Dt2e¤
1(x) < 0 and Dt2e¤
+(x) > 0 for every x 2 supp¸, which means (4.5.2) cannot hold.
Therefore, ®¤ = 0. If Nation 2’s technology is dirty, then any increase in its private capital
hurts Firm 1 by reducing its emission and hurts Consumer 1 by raising total emission.
Thus, in this case, Nation 1 has no incentive to invest in Nation 2.
On the other hand, if Dtef(t2(x);e¤
2(x)) < 0 for every x 2 supp¸, then Proposition
3.1.4 implies Dt2e¤
1(x) > 0 and Dt2e¤
+(x) < 0 for every x 2 supp¸. Consequently, it is
possible that ®¤ > 0. Nation 1 beneﬁts strategically from investing ®¤ > 0 in Nation
2’s private capital as this raises Firm 1’s proﬁt by increasing e1 and lowers Consumer 1’s
damage by decreasing e+. Analogous arguments hold for the possibility of Firm 1 investing
in t2. Compared to Firm 1, Nation 1 has a stronger marginal incentive to overinvest in
Nation 2’s private capital.
24Proposition 4.5.3. If Nation 2’s technology is dirty, then neither Nation 1, nor Firm 1,
will invest in Nation 2’s private capital. If Nation 2’s technology is clean, then Nation 1
(resp. Firm 1) may choose t¤
2 > 0 (resp. t¤¤
2 > 0).
5. Dynamics and stability
5.1 The dynamical system
In this section, we turn to the problem of determining equilibrium allocations given
the type proﬁle. We show that, for every type proﬁle µ 2 Θ2, the allocations determined by
the best reply tˆ atonnement converge to the equilibrium proﬁle e(µ) provided the process
starts suﬃciently close to e(µ).
Let e be a team plan. Fix µ 2 Θ2 and let e(µ) = e¤ = (e¤
1;e¤
2). We postulate the best
reply dynamical system determining e(¿) = (e1(¿);e2(¿)) for ¿ 2 <+:
De1(¿) = ¯1(e2(¿);µ1) ¡ e1(¿)
De2(¿) = ¯2(e1(¿);µ2) ¡ e2(¿)
(5:1:1)
where ¯i is Nation i’s best reply mapping. Note that ¿ 7! e¤ is a steady state solution
of (5.1.1). We ask: is ¿ 7! e¤ a locally asymptotically stable solution of (5.1.1)? It is








have negative real parts. Given the negative diagonal of B, a standard application of
















Assumptions 2.3.5 and 2.3.12 imply jD¯1(e¤
2)j < 1 and jD¯2(e¤
1)j < 1. Thus, B has a
dominant diagonal.
Proposition 5.1.2. If e is a team plan, then ¿ 7! e(µ) is a locally asymptotically stable
solution of (5.1.1) for every µ 2 Θ2.
6. Conclusions and extensions
We have constructed and analyzed an incomplete information model of emission cap-
ping with the objectives of deriving (a) the implications of international heterogeneity,
25and (b) the strategic manipulations that nations will undertake in this framework. Rather
than re-state the results and interpretations stated in Sections 3 and 4, we enrich these
interpretations by postulating that Nation 1 has clean technology while Nation 2 has dirty
technology. Since selection of types in the model developed in this paper amounts to choos-
ing levels of diﬀerent types of investment, we are implicitly assuming that Nation 1 has
the resources for investment while Nation 2 does not have such resources. Therefore, we
adopt the suggestive nomenclature: Nation 1 is North (i.e., developed and aﬄuent) and
Nation 2 is South (i.e., less developed and poor). Given these conventions, we have the
following broad results.
North overinvests in domestic social capital (Propositions 4.2.5 and 4.4.2), underin-
vests in domestic private capital (Proposition 4.2.6), and does not invest in the South
(Propositions 4.5.1 and 4.5.3). The eﬀect of all these manipulations is to raise North’s
emission, lower South’s emission and raise the total emission. The results for the Northern
ﬁrm are qualitatively similar (Propositions 4.3.3, 4.5.1 and 4.5.3) but there are diﬀerences.
For instance, the variable targeted for manipulation by North in the above cases is
the Southern cap (Remark 4.2.7), while the variable targeted by the Northern ﬁrm is
the Northern cap (Remark 4.3.4). Nor is the extent of manipulation the same. With
respect to domestic private capital, North underinvests less severely than the Northern
ﬁrm (Propositions 4.3.5 and 4.4.3), while the comparison is ambiguous in the case of social
capital (Remark 4.3.6).
Neither North, nor the Northern ﬁrm, will invest in South, but private investment
across nations of the North is possible (Proposition 4.5.3). The eﬀect of investing abroad
in another Northern nation is to raise the domestic emission while lowering foreign and
total emission.
Our model yields some results regarding the ordering of emission caps. Ceteris paribus,
nations with greater social capital have larger caps in equilibrium (Proposition 3.2.1). The
result in terms of private capital depends on the assumption that larger private capital
implies cleaner technology. Given this assumption, ceteris paribus, the emission caps of
Southern nations are positively related to the size of their private capital, while the caps
of Northern nations are negatively related to the size of their private capital (Proposition
3.2.2).
With respect to the eﬀects of economic growth, one can have the following scenario
suggested by Proposition 3.1.4(A) and (B), given plausible parametric conditions (essen-
tially, we require that Northern social capital should be suﬃciently large). Suppose North
26emits more than South, North has clean technology, South has dirty technology and tech-
nology becomes cleaner as private capital grows. As Northern and Southern private capitals
grows, South emits more and North emits less, i.e., their emissions converge. As South-
ern private capital grows, so does its emission, until private capital becomes so large that
Southern technology becomes clean. After this point, further growth of private capital
lowers the emission cap and therefore also lowers national proﬁt. Clearly, the only way
for private capital to grow further is to loosen the binding emission cap. The only way
for a nation with clean technology to do so is to invest in domestic social capital. Thus,
investment in social capital is not merely a desirable end in itself, but also a strategic way
of gaining head-room for the growth of private capital.
The growth of Southern private capital raises total emission, while the growth of
Northern private capital lowers total emission. It follows that a “green” who wishes to
minimize total emission will favor private investment (i.e., growth) in the North and not in
the South. This observation points to a political conﬂict between the objectives of green
lobbies and the developmental ambitions of the South.
The model we have studied is intended to be a positive representation of the outcomes
of the capping process, while much of the discussion about this issue tends to have a strong
normative tendency. As in all such policy issues, the two strands need to be harnessed
together: prescriptions need to be tempered by implementability constraints. While our
positive model is a means for understanding these constraints and working out some broad
implications, normative considerations can easily and properly be accommodated.
A team plan represents the positive aspect of the model since it models the minimal
constraints on emission cap proﬁles that sovereign nations will accept. However, there can
be numerous team plans with varying implications for the distribution and total quantum
of caps. We need a normative criterion, i.e., a team welfare function, in order to rank
various team plans. Given such a criterion, it is possible to ﬁnd an optimal team plan.
Note that our results apply equally to all team plans, including the optimal one with
respect to the team welfare function.
Such a framework organizes the controversies regarding emission capping into the
following categories. First, there can be debate about the normative criterion to be used in
choosing a team plan. For instance, international politics will determine the extent to which
green concerns advocated by environmental groups and egalitarian concerns advocated by
groups in the South will be incorporated in the team welfare function. Secondly, there can
be discussion about how abstract concepts such as “damage”, “private capital”, “social
27capital”, etc., are to be deﬁned operationally. For example, will Northern investment in the
form of “buying” and “protecting” rain forests constitute investment in social capital, and
therefore, entitle the relevant Northern entity to favorable treatment in terms of emission
caps? Thirdly, there can be discussion about the powers of international institutions to
verify national types, monitor actions and provide incentives.
We ﬁnally make some informal remarks regarding the implications of emission rights
trading in the context of our model; it is straightforward to formalize this discussion. The
emission cap allocations in our model represent an equilibrium when the decision-makers
regarding caps are nations. By construction, each nation’s emission cap is a binding
constraint on that nation’s ﬁrm, i.e., in the absence of emission rights trading, all the
options to emit will be exercised. As each national ﬁrm’s payoﬀ diﬀers from that of the
nation, there exist potential gains from trade in emission rights among the national ﬁrms
because of the variation in shadow values of emission rights across national ﬁrms. If
emission rights trading among national ﬁrms is permitted, then the post-trade allocation
of emission rights must be preferred to the pre-trade allocation by each national ﬁrm since
each national ﬁrm has the option of not trading. Not only do all the national ﬁrms prefer
the post-trade allocation, so do all the nations because, while all the national ﬁrms are
better oﬀ, each national consumer is indiﬀerent as the aggregate emission is unchanged.
So, it appears that emission rights trading is welfare-enhancing and ought to be permitted.
However, if this possibility is common knowledge and foreseen at the time the caps are
negotiated, then all the nations will take into account the possibility of mercantile proﬁts,
and therefore demand arbitrarily large caps in the negotiations. This, of course, undermines
the very foundation of the capping regime which creates the potential gains from trade that
translate into mercantile proﬁts. Thus, in the context of our model, there is a fundamental
tension between (a) the desire to anchor emission caps in a systematic economic allocation
framework, and (b) the desire to exhaust all potential gains from trade after the caps are
awarded. This tension is analogous to that in the contracting literature between the desire
to design a contract that provides appropriate ex ante incentives to the contracting parties
and the desire to eliminate ex post ineﬃciencies via renegotiation of contracts.
There remain to study a number of aspects of the general model presented here.
First, it remains to study the participation game. Secondly, it is of interest to understand
the link between team welfare criteria and team plans. Thirdly, it remains to consider a
multi-round extension of the allocation game so that a full dynamic analysis is possible.
Finally, it would also be of interest to relax the assumption of one-time, simultaneous and
28irrevocable participation decisions. This would introduce into the model considerations
such as optimal timing and the option value of delay.
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